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TAXATION
CHARLES H. RANDALL, JR.*
Legislation
The major developments in South Carolina tax law during
the past year' were the result of legislation rather than
judicial decision. In 1958, the General Assembly established
the South Carolina Tax Study Commission,2 composed of
three persons to be chosen from the Senate, three from the
House of Representatives and three to be appointed by the
Governor.3 Several legislative recommendations of this Study
Commission were adopted during the 1961 Regular Session
of the General Assembly.
Of most general interest, effective with respect to the es-
tate of any decedent dying after December 31, 1961, is the
adoption of a South Carolina Estate Tax,4 and the repeal
effective on that date of the existing Inheritance and Estate
Tax laws.5 The new statutory scheme is aimed at simplify-
ing the work of counsel for executors or administrators and
estate planners, and in addition is expected to relieve the
Inheritance Tax Division of the South Carolina Tax Commis-
sion as well as probate judges of much technical work. Under
the new law, tax returns are required only for estates which
would have to file a federal return anyway, thus eliminating
any returns or State transfer taxes on "gross estates," as
defined below $60,000. This eliminates entirely the manifold
problems, computational and otherwise, involved in current
inheritance taxation of small estates. Furthermore, since the
new statute largely incorporates by reference much of the
current Federal Estate Tax6 statutory language, counsel will
have but one set of tax laws to consult3 The Tax Commission
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. The survey of cases herein includes cases decided between April 1,
1960 and March 31, 1961, while the legislation discussed covers the entire
1961 Session of the General Assembly, ending May 18, 1961.
2. Act No. 770 of 1958, amended by Act No. 218 of 1959.
3. The composition of the Commission for 1961 was: for the Senate,
Senators Edgar A. Brown, Marshall J. Parker and John C. West; for the
House of Representatives, Representatives R. J. Aycock, C. Heyward
Belser and E. LeRoy Nettles; and Governor's appointees, Dr. George H.
Aull, A. Crawford Clarkson and R. M. Jeffries.
4. Act No. 382 of 1961.
5. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA §§ 65-451 to-529, 65-551 to-553
(1952).
6. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2001-2209.
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and probate judges will be relieved of the onerous burden of
processing the "continual stream of paper shuffling and
correspondence ' 8 currently required to pass between them
regarding issuance of letters of administration or probate
of wills.
The new estate tax adopts the federal definition of the
"gross estate," but excluding in the case of residents real
or tangible personal property with a situs outside the State.
Non-residents, of course, are only taxed on property within
the State. The federal definition of the "taxable estate" is
also adopted, permitting deductions as allowed by federal
code sections 2051 through 2056 inclusive.'0 The "taxable
estate" thus computed is taxed at 4 per cent for the first
$40,000, 5 per cent the next $60,000 and 6 per cent for the
excess over $100,000." The Additional Estate Tax in the
current law' 2 is continued in the new statute3 in order to
take full advantage of the federal credit of State death
taxes.' 4 Provisions for transfer liability in some cases, par-
alleling federal provisions,'" are also introduced into the
new statute.'0
the date of enactment of the new law, so that no problem of legislative
delegation should arise. Santee Mills v. Query, 122 S. C. 158, 115 S. E. 150
(1922) ; 1935-36 Op. Atty. Gen. 238. Decisions of the federal courts con-
struing the incorporated sections are entitled to at least persuasive weight,
McDowell v. Stilley Plywood Co., 210 S. C. 173, 41 S. E. 2d 872 (1947),
and perhaps presumptive weight, Fuller v. S. C. Tax Commission, 128
S. C. 14, 121 S. E. 478 (1924).
8. SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, SOUTH CAROLINA TAX STUDY COmISSION,
p. 14 (1961).
9, Act No. 382 of 1961, § 3 incorporates INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 2031-2034.
10. Act No. 382 of 1961, § 5 permits deductions as set out in INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, §§ 2051-2056.
11. Act No. 382 of 1961, § 1. Section 2 permits credits for previously
taxed property, following generally the scheme of INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 2013 (1954). This reduces double taxation where property passes through
two successive estates within a short period of time.
12. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA §§ 654-551 to-553 (1952).
13. Act No. 382 of 1961, art. 3.
14. INT. REV. CODS of 1954, § 2011.
15. Id., §§ 2205-07. These sections solve relatively few of the problems
of apportionment of taxes and other burdens between beneficiaries of an
estate, or between beneficiaries of the estate and beneficiaries of inter
vivos arrangements created by the decedent during his lifetime. The de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of South Carolina in Myers v. Singler, 235
S. C. 162, 110 S. E. 2d 241 (1959) and Gaither v. United States Trust Co.,
230 S. C. 668, 97 S. E. 2d 24 (1957) will continue to control in other cases
in which the decedent does not specify where he wishes these burdens to
fall. These cases are discussed in Randall, Taxation, 1960 Survey of S. C.
Law, 13 S. C. L. Q. 381-83 (1960), and Randall, Taxation, 1957 Survey of
S. C. Law, 10 S. C. L. Q. 131-35 (1957); generally, see LoWNDES AND
KRAi.En, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIF TAXES, 614-617.
16. Act No. 382 of 1961, art. 10, §§ 2-4.
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In addition to the estate tax, several other amendments
to current tax law were proposed by the Tax Study Commis-
sion and passed by the General Assembly.17 A proposal was
made to the Tax Study Commission that the State incorporate
by reference in its own tax law the entire federal law of
income taxation. The Tax Study Commission indicated that
it "unanimously endorsed the basic concept of the proposal,"
but due to the need for further study, no recommendation was
made thereon at this time.18 In one important instance, the
so-called merchant's "floor tax," the proposal of the Tax
Study Commission was rejected in favor of a Joint Resolution
by the General Assembly directing the Tax Commission to
reduce the assessment rates under this tax, over a period of
three years.19
Fixed Fee License Tax, Interstate Commerce
In Okan Mills v. Town of Kingstree" plaintiff corporation
was a commercial photographer with its principal place of
business in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and sued to recover the
sum of $45 assessed by the Town2' for a business license
and paid under protest by plaintiff. Plaintiff asserted that
imposition of the tax was in violation of the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution of the United States.22 The plaintiff's
method of doing business is set forth succinctly by Mr. Jus-
tice (now Chief Justice) Taylor in his opinion:
23
17. Adopting or closely following the recommendations of the Tax Study
Commission were the following: Installment Method of Reporting Income,
Act No. 165 of 1961; Further Defining the Term "Adjusted Gross In-
come," Act No. 166 of 1961; Increasing the Limitations with Respect to
Deductions for Charitable Contributions, Act No. 208 of 1961; Tax Com-
mission's Power of Waiving Penalties and Interest, Act No. 277 of 1961;
Admissions Taxes for Athletic Contests of Institutions of Higher Learn-
ing, Act No. 278 of 1961; Exemptions from Soft Drinks Tax, Act No.
279 of 1961; Reports and License Fees of Corporations, Act No. 167 of
1961; Use Tax on Construction Equipment Act No. 209, of 1961; and
Preparation and Publishing of Annual Statistics by Tax Commission, Act
No. 148 of 1961.
18. REPORT, supra note 8, at 17. The State has employed a similar tech-
nique in levying a tax on corporate income. See Santee Mills v. Query,
supra note 7.
19. Act No. 439 of 1961.
20. 236 S. C. 535, 115 S. E. 2d 52 (1960).
21. The Town seems to have assessed the license tax based on classify-
ing the photographer as a "resident." Fees for residents were set at $20
for annual gross income of $1,000 or less, and $5 for each additional
$1,000 or fraction thereof. For non-residents, the license tax was doubled.
Transcript of Record, pp. 2,3; 236 S. 0. 535, 115 S. E. 2d 52 (1960).
22. U. S. CONST. art. I § 8.
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.... As a first step, an advance salesman traveling from
place to place solicits orders for photographs to be pro-
cessed at the Chattanooga plant. He collects a deposit
and arranges for a sitting or exposure. Second, a travel-
ing cameraman takes the pictures as previously arranged
and collects an additional payment. Third, the exposed
film is sent to Chattanooga where the film is developed
and proofs for showing are printed. Fourth, the proofs
are mailed to a traveling salesman who presents same
to the customer for his selection and order. Fifth, ap-
proved proofs are then mailed back to Chattanooga,
where the photographs are manufactured and processed;
and, finally, the finished photographs are mailed to the
customer.
The Court held that the case was governed by the "drummer"
line of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States,
of which Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District24 and
Nippert v. Richmond25 are leading. These decisions estab-
lished the unconstitutionality of State or municipal fixed-fee
privilege taxes on the soliciting of orders for later interstate
shipment. The principle has been recently reasserted in a
dictum in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. V.
Minnesota.20 Several bases for these decisions have been sug-
gested. It is said that the privilege of engaging in interstate
commerce is not one granted by the States, and therefore is
not a subject of their taxing power; that the taxes involved
are of a fixed-fee class, and hence bear particularly heavily
upon an itinerant solicitor of a product of a highly limited
character, who makes only sporadic visits to any particular
town; and that such taxes are often laid by municipalities
and other subdivisions of states, hence giving rise to the
danger of a cumulative effect if many municipalities resort
to the same revenue-raising device.27
The principal issue in the case was whether the activities of
Olan Mills were exclusively interstate commerce activities,
or whether the local activities were of sufficient importance
to permit a finding that the company was doing a local busi-
ness. The case was decided on demurrer to the complaint, and
24. 120 U. S. 489, 30 L. Ed. 694 (1887).
25. 327 U. S. 416, 90 L. Ed. 761 (1946).
26. 358 U. S. 450, 3 L. Ed. 2d 421 (1959).
27. Nippert v. Richmond, supra.
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the circuit judge, relying on Lucas v. City of Charlotte,2 8
found the local incidents sufficient to sustain the tax. In re-
versing, the Supreme Court of South Carolina found that
the local incidents in connection with the sale of photographs
were each an "inseparable link in the chain of events which
culminate in the final photograph"29 and hence were an in-
tegral part of the process of interstate commerce.
Exemption From State Stamp Taxes on Notes Issued by
Building and Loan Association to Secure
Federal Home Loan Bank "Advances"
The decision in Laurens Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tion v. South Carolina Tax Commission,30 decided by the
Supreme Court of South Carolina in 1960 and discussed in
this survey last year,31 was reversed on certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States.82 Discussion herein will
be limited to adding a few remarks to the comments in last
year's survey. Mr. Justice Black, for a unanimous Court,
found that the "advances" were exempt from taxation under
the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932,83 and that the
Pittman case34 was controlling authority for the proposition
that it made no difference that the tax was laid not directly
on the Home Loan Bank but indirectly, on a member Associa-
tion. Further support for this view was found in the legis-
lative history of the 1932 Act, in that the intent of the statute
was to make mortgage funds available at low cost to home
owners.
The Court found that no repeal of the exemption was ef-
fected by the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933.35 No express
language provided for such repeal, nor could intimation to-
ward reduction of the scope of the exempt status be found
in the legislative history. Nor could the Court find any basis
28. 86 F. 2d 394, 109 A.L.R. 297 (4th Cir., 1936). The facts in the
Lucas case, involving a different photographic company, were virtually
identical to those in the instant case, but problems of federal jurisdiction
and procedure involved in the former case were urged by appellant as
grounds for distinguishing the two cases.
29. 236 S. C. 535, 538, 115 S. E. 2d 52, 54 (1960).
30. 236 S. C. 2, 112 S. E. 2d 716 (1960).
31. 13 S. C. L. Q. 386 (1960).
32. -U. S.-, 5 L. Ed. 2d 749 (1961).
33. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1421 (1952).
34. Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U. S. 21, 84 L. Ed. 11
(1939).
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for the view that the exemption was repealed by implica-
tion :3
It also would be difficult to think of less apt circum-
stances for the finding of an implied repeal. These two
Acts, both designed to provide home owners with easy
credit at low cost, were passed within a year of each
other on the basis of the same hearings and when read
together form a consistent scheme in which the 1932
exemption provision contributes to the major purpose
of low-cost credit precisely as it did before passage of the
1933 Act.
Property Tax - Intangible Personal Property
In Francis Maiion Life Insurance Co. v. City of Columbia,,3 7
plaintiff sued to recover property taxes assessed against cer-
tain intangibles for the calendar years 1957 and 1958. Plain-
tiff predicated his claim on two grounds: first, that the
exaction was unconstitutional 38 in that no legislation had been
"especially provided by the General Assembly by the author-
ity and within the limitation of this [constitutional] provi-
sion" authorizing the tax; and second, that the tax imposed
was in excess of the limitation set forth in the same consti-
tutional provision.
Prior to 1932, when this amendment to Article X, Section
1 of the Constitution became effective, there existed no con-
36. -U. S.-, 5 L. Ed. 2d 749 (1961).
37. 237 S. C. 162, 115 S. E. 2d 796 (1960).
38. S. C. CONST. art. 10 § 1 (1895) was amended by submission to the
electorate of an amendment proposed by the General Assembly. The
amendment became effective in 1932. The pertinent parts of the section
as amended now provide:
§ 1. Taxation and assessment.
The General Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform and
equal rate of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe regu-
lations to secure a just valuation for taxation of all property,
real, personal and possessory .... Provided, Further, That the
General Assembly may provide by law for the assessment of all
intangible personal property, including moneys, credits, bank de-
posits, corporate stocks, and bonds, at its true value for taxation
for State, County and municipal purposes or either thereof: Pro-
vided, That the total rate of taxation imposed thereon shall never
exceed one-half of one per centum of the actual value of such in-
tangible property: Provided, Further, That such intangible per-
sonal property shall not be subject to the three mill levy provided
by Section 10, Article 11, of this instrument or to any other
general or special tax levy, except such as is especially provided
by the General Assembly by the authority and within the limita-
tion of this provision. ...
[Vol. 14
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stitutional barrier against taxation of intangible personal
property as such. Statutes had been enacted, dating from
1881 and 1915, 39 generally permitting taxation of intangibles.
In both 1942 and 1952, the legislature adopted codes re-
enacting these laws. Thus, a very narrow question was pre-
sented in the case on the first issue, that is, whether the
codifications in 1942 and 1952 constituted legislation "espec-
ially provided" within the meaning of the constitutional pro-
vision. In upholding the taxpayer, the Court, per Mr. Justice
(now Chief Justice) Taylor, held that while the recodif-
ication might constitute "legislative action,' authorizing the
tax, it did not constitute legislation "especially provided...
by the authority and within the limitation of this provision."
The city had argued that since statutory authority already
existed to assess the tax, enactment of additional legislation
"would have been a useless legislative performance." 4 0 Since
the plaintiff prevailed on this ground, the Court did not reach
the plaintiff's second contention.
39. Now found in CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA §§ 65-1521, 65-
1501 (2) and 65-1721 (1952).
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